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STATE DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACTS: SHOULD
WISCONSIN LAWYERS BE SUSCEPTIBLE TO
LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 100.20?
I. INTRODUCTION
Every state in this country has enacted a deceptive trade practice or
consumer protection statute. Although these statutes vary from state to
state and may be modeled after different federal acts, they all have the
same basic purpose-to protect the public from unfair or deceptive acts
or practices with respect to the sale of goods or services. It is the
application of these statutes to those who supply services, rather than
goods, which has produced mixed results among the states. Perhaps the
most surprising result has occurred in jurisdictions that have applied
these acts to certain types of attorney conduct, including advertising by
1. The corresponding state statutes are as follows: ALA. CODE § 8-19-5 (1993); ALASKA
STAT. § 45.50.471 (Michie 1998); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1522 (West 1994); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 4-88-107 (Michie 1996); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200, 17500 (West 1997); CAL.
CIV. CODE § 1770 (West 1985 & Supp. 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-105 (West
1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-110b (West 1992 & Supp. 1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6,
§ 2513 (1993 & Supp. 1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.204 (West 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-
393 (1994 & Supp. 1999); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 481A 3 Michie 1999); IDAHO CODE §
48-603 (1997); ILL. COMP. STAT. 815/505-2 (West 1993 & Supp. 1995); IND. CODE ANN. §
24 5-0.5-3 (West 1998); IOWA CODE ANN. § 714.16(2) (West 1993 & Supp. 1995); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 50-626 (1994); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.170 (Michie 1998); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 51.1405 (West 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 207 (West 1989); MD. CODE
ANN., COM. LAW I § 13-303 (1990 & Supp. 1994); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 2
(West 1997); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.903 (West 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325D.44
(West 1995); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-24-5 (1991 & Supp. 1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.020
(West 1990 & Supp. 1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-103 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 59-
1602 (1998); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 598.0914 (Michie 1998); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 358-
A:2 (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2 (West 1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-2 (Michie 1999);
N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349 (McKinney 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1994); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 51-15-02 (1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.02 (West 1993 & Supp. 1998); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 201 § 3 (1997); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 646.607, 646.608 (1997); 73 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 201-3 (1993 & Supp. 1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13.1-2 (1992); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 39-5-20 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 37-24-6 (Michie 1994);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-104 (1995 & Supp. 1998); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17A6
(West 1987 & Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-5-2.5 (1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2453
(1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-200 (Michie 1998); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.86.020
(West 1999); W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-104 (Michie 1998); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 100.20 (West
1998); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-12-105 (1993). See also Shelley D. Gatlin, Attorney Liability
Under Deceptive Trade Practices Acts, 15 REV. LrTIG. 397,399-400, n. 9 (1996).
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lawyers and other commercial or entrepreneurial aspects of the practice
of law.
This Comment seeks to provide an overview of the application of
consumer protection acts as well as to propose an extension of the
application of Wisconsin's Deceptive Trade Practices Acte to certain
aspects of the practice of law! Section II provides a brief general
history of unfair trade practice and consumer protection acts, including
how they developed and their general purposes. Section III includes an
overview of the conflicting positions taken by courts and legislatures
faced with the issue of whether to apply their state's deceptive trade or
consumer protection statute to the conduct of attorneys. Section IV
discusses a client's typical methods of recovery against an attorney, such
as a malpractice action, and explains how a claim brought under an
unfair trade statute would differ. Section V examines Wisconsin's
Deceptive Trade Practices Act4 and concludes with a recommendation
that the Wisconsin Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer
Protection Division issue a ruling extending the scope of section 100.20
to include unfair and deceptive conduct by lawyers, limited to the
commercial and entrepreneurial aspects of law.
II. THE HISTORY OF DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICE AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACTS
Consumer protection legislation is a relatively new concept,
developed primarily in the past three decades.5 The purpose of these
statutes is "to provide a private cause of action for consumers injured by
unfair or deceptive commercial practices."' The Uniform Deceptive
Trade Practices Act7 served as a model for some states; others based
their statutes on the Sherman Antitrust Act' or the Federal Trade
2 See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 100.20 (West 1998). Section 100.20 gives the Department of
Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection "the ability to create rules that regulate [unfair]
business practices." WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, TRADE AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION, WHEN A CONSUMER FILES A COMPLAINT AGAINST YOU OR YOUR
BUSINESS: ENFORCEMENT OF WISCONSIN'S FAIR TRADE PRACrICES LAWS. Rules
promulgated by the Department are part of the Wisconsin Administrative Code. See id.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 146-55.
4. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 100.20 (West 1998).
5. See Gatlin, supra note 1 at 399.
6. Id. at 400.
7. UNIFORM DECEPTIVE TRADE PRAcnIcES AcT § 551-9, 7A U.L.A. 274 (1985 &
Supp. 1993).
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-78 (1988).
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Commission Act of 1938. 9 The development of these laws has been
attributed to "the increasingly impersonal nature of the marketplace
and consumer dissatisfaction with the traditional commercial law
remedies for mistreatment by large-scale business organizations."10
Wisconsin's Deceptive Trade Practices Act provides: "[m]ethods of
competition in business and trade practices in business shall be fair.
Unfair methods of competition in business and unfair trade practices in
business are hereby prohibited."11 The Wisconsin Legislature enacted its
version of an unfair trade practice act in 1921,12 well before most other
states had done so. This Comment will examine Wisconsin's unfair
competition statute more thoroughly in Section V. First, this Comment
will review the approaches taken by other states, ranging from judicial
application to attorneys to legislative exclusion of attorney conduct.
III. LIABILrTY OF ATTORNEYS UNDER DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICE
AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACTS
A. Liability Extended to Attorneys
An attorney's liability under a deceptive trade practice act was first
recognized by the Fourth Circuit Appellate Court of Louisiana in Reed
v. Allison & Perrone.13 The defendant attorneys operated a legal clinic
and used newspaper advertisements to promote the services of their
clinic. 4 The plaintiffs, attorneys who also operated a legal clinic, alleged
that the defendants' advertisements were "misleading, confusing, and
deceptive" and had damaged plaintiffs' business and reputations. 5 They
sought an injunction under the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and
Consumer Protection Law,16 preventing defendants from further
advertising. 7
The defendants conceded that a portion of one of their
9. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1994).
10. Randall S. Hetrick, Comment, Unfair Trade Practices Acts Applied to Attorney
Conduct: A National Review, 18 J. LEGAL PRoF. 329 (1993) (citing William A. Lovett, State
Deceptive Trade Practice Legislation, 46 TUL. L. REV. 723,725 (1972)).
11. See WIS. STAT. ANN. §100.20 (West 1998).
12. 1921 Wis. Laws ch. 571.
13. 376 So. 2d 1067 (La. Ct. App. 1979).
14. See id. at 1068.
15. Id.
16. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1405A (West 1972)
17. See Reed v. Allison & Perrone, 376 So. 2d 1067,1069 (La. Ct. App. 1979).
1999]
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advertisements might have been misleading.'8  That particular
advertisement stated, "[w]e have resolved the problems of roughly 60%
of our clients at the initial consultation with no additional fee."'9
Despite defendants' admission, the court refused to grant the
injunction on the grounds that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that the
defendants' false advertisements had caused them "irreparable injury."'
However, the court's holding proved very significant. It clearly stated
that attorney advertising is subject to Louisiana's Unfair Trade Practices
Act because it constitutes a "trade" or "commerce" as defined in the
Act.2  In addition, the court noted that although attorney
advertisements are also subject to review by the state bar association,
they are not immune from liability under state legislation.' This was an
unprecedented step for any court and proved to be the beginning of an
extension of liability under deceptive trade practices acts.
In 1980, the Court of Civil Appeals of Houston, Texas went a step
further than the Reed court and held that the Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices Act" "applied to the purchase or acquisition of legal
services."'24 The plaintiffs in this case sought recovery from the
defendant attorney for defective preparation of a petition for the name
change of a minor child.' With respect to this name change, the trial
court found that Attorney DeBakey had failed "to secure the
appointment of an attorney ad litem," filed a petition that he knew to be
defective, and basically offered nothing of value to the plaintiffs.
26
Among other things, the plaintiffs alleged a cause of action under
Texas's Deceptive Trade Practices Act.27  The court rejected the
defendant's argument that the plaintiffs were not "consumers" as
required by the Act because they were purchasing "services of an
intangible nature. '" The court held that the attorney's actions
constituted "services" under the Act and that the plaintiffs were
18. See id. at 1069.
19. Id. The opinion offers no further explanation of exactly what made this statement
misleading.
20. Id.
21. See id. at 1068-69.
22. See id. at 1068.
23. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45 (West 1979).
24. DeBakey v. Staggs, 605 S.W.2d 631, 633 (Tex. App. 1980).
25. See id.
26. See id. at 632.
27. See id.
28. Id. at 633.
[83:497
CONSUMER PROTECTIONACTS
"consumers" who purchased these services. The court awarded the
plaintiffs both attorney's fees and treble damages as mandated by the
Act;30 an obvious advantage to recovery under this act rather than a
typical malpractice cause of action.'
The Supreme Court of Connecticut encountered a much different
situation in Heslin v. Connecticut Law Clinic of Trantolo & Trantolo.32
The defendant attorneys were under investigation by the State
Commissioner of Consumer Protection for alleged misleading
advertising.3 This advertising included misuse of the term "legal clinic"
and misrepresentations as to their fees and the fees of other attorneys
offering the same services as the clinic?4 The Commissioner ordered an
investigative demand pursuant to the Connecticut Unfair Trade
Practices Act and the defendant refused to comply claiming a lack of
authority on the part of the Commissioner."
The point of contention in this inquiry was whether the "provision of
legal services constitutes 'the conduct of any trade or commerce,"' as
required by the Connecticut statute.3 The court noted that many such
acts do not mention legal services, primarily because they were often
enacted "before lawyers engaged in advertising."'37  In fact, the
Connecticut statute, as well as its equivalent in many other states, was
enacted before the seminal case of Bates v. State Bar of Arizona.'
The United States Supreme Court in Bates held that advertising by
lawyers was protected commercial speech under the First Amendment.39
This decision was in part based on the fact that "the belief that lawyers
are somehow 'above' trade has become an anachronism."'  The Court
realized that permitting lawyer advertising would expose the public to a
risk that lawyers might engage in misleading or deceptive advertising
and that regulation would be necessary to minimize that risk.41
29. Id.
30. See id. at 634.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 123-28.
32. 461 A.2d 938 (Conn. 1983).
33. See id. at 939.
34. See id.
35. See id. at 940.
36. Id. at 941.
37. Id.
38. 433 U.S. 350,380-82 (1977).
39. See id. at 380.
40. Id. at 371-72.
41. See id. at 379.
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The Heslin court found the reasoning from Bates to be
dipositive-awyers who advertise are engaging in trade.42 In addition,
the court looked at the intent of the Connecticut Legislature, which
provided that interpretations of its statute should be guided by the
Federal Trade Commission and the federal courts' interpretations of
section 45(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act.43 Although the
federal courts have not addressed whether section 45(a)(1) applies to
attorneys, the Supreme Court has applied the Act to medical
professionals." Furthermore, the Court has "decided that the practice
of law may constitute the conduct of a trade or commerce under the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act."45 Based on Supreme Court precedent, the
Heslin court concluded that "the federal courts would construe the FTC
Act as applying to attorneys" under this particular set of facts.'
The court also quickly disposed of the defendants' contention that
application of the Unfair Trade Practices Act would be a violation of the
separation of powers doctrine under the Connecticut Constitution.
The defendants argued that because the constitution grants "the
judiciary exclusive authority to regulate the professional conduct of
attorneys" it implicitly prohibits the regulation of attorneys by the
legislature.4 Although the court conceded that conduct covered by the
Consumer Unfair Trade Protection Act might also overlap with areas
under control of the court, it held that this does not render the
application of the statute to lawyers unconstitutional.49 The disciplinary
function of the judiciary differs significantly from the Act in one
aspect-it does not allow for recovery by those who are victims of
42. See Heslin v. Connecticut Law Clinic of Trantolo, 461 A.2d 938, 941-42 (Conn.
1983).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976). This section provides: "Unfair methods of competition
in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce,
are declared unlawful." Id.
44. See American Medical Association v. Federal Trade Commission, 688 F.2d 443 (2d
Cir. 1980), affd by an equally divided Court, 455 U.S. 676 (1982).
45. Heslin, 461 A.2d at 942, referring to the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 as
applied to attorneys in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 786-88 (1975).
46. Heslin, 461 A.2d at 942.
47. See id. at 943. The relevant portion of the Connecticut Constitution provides: "[t]he
powers of government shall be divided into three distinct departments, and each of them
confided to a separate magistracy, to wit, those which are legislative, to one; those which are
executive, to another; and those which are judicial, to another." Id. (citing CONN. CONST. art.
V § 1).
48. See Heslin, 461 A.2d at 943.
49. See id.
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attorney misconduct-and this is where the Act steps in.'
Although it may appear that the Connecticut Supreme Court
opened the floodgates of claims against lawyers under the Act, the scope
of its holding was restricted by a later decision. In Haynes v. Yale-New
Haven Hospital, the court held that the Act covered "only the
entrepreneurial aspects of the practice of law" and not "professional
negligence... [i.e.] malpractice.""1 The court was only willing to apply
the Act to claims against attorneys that differed from traditional
malpractice claims and recognized that the Act has a unique purpose.'
B. Suggested Extension of Liability to Attorneys
Several state courts have held that although in a particular case a
lawyer's conduct did not fall within the purview of that state's deceptive
practices act, certain conduct would be subject to the act. For example,
in Short v. Demopolis, the Supreme Court of Washington held that
Washington's Consumer Protection Act governs "certain
entrepreneurial aspects of the practice of law."' These aspects include
"how the price of legal fees is determined, billed, and collected and the
way a law firm obtains, retains, and dismisses clients."'
In this case, a law firm sought recovery of fees that a former client
allegedly owed to it.5 The client filed a counterclaim, disputing the fees
owed and alleging both malpractice and violations of Washington's
Consumer Protection Act.m The court looked to legislative intent in
order to interpret the statute.s
Like the Connecticut Legislature, the Washington Legislature had
prescribed that because the Consumer Protection Act was modeled
after federal law, federal law should be followed in interpreting its
reaches.' The court reasoned that lawyers should not be categorically
exempted from the Act since Washington's law was adopted practically
50. See id. at 945.
51. 699 A.2d 964, 972 (Conn. 1997).
52. See id.
53. 691 P.2d 163,168 (Wash. 1984).
54. Id.
55. See id. at 164. Some insurers have "reported that malpractice claims filed in
response to fee actions comprise approximately twenty percent of all claims against
attorneys." RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACrICE § 1.1, at 6
(3d ed. 1989).
56. See id. at 165.
57. See i at 166.
58. See id. at 168.
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verbatim from federal antitrust laws and the federal law no longer
followed the "learned professions"59 exception.6 The intent of the Act,
in the court's view, was "to bring within its reaches every person who
conducts unfair or deceptive acts or practices in any trade or
commerce."
61
The Short court also explored "whether the application of the CPA
to attorneys would be an unconstitutional legislative invasion of the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in its power to regulate the practice of
law."62 The plaintiff attorneys argued that application of the Act to the
practice of law would violate the separation of powers doctrine because
the state constitution vested the state supreme court with the power to
regulate the legal field.? The court recognized that the purposes of the
judicial disciplinary system and the Consumer Protection Act were very
different and could coexist without violating the constitution.'
The Short case provides two important factors for courts to look at
when making the determination of whether to extend the application of
consumer fraud and unfair trade practices statutes to the practice of law.
First, would extension of coverage in the particular situation be in the
public interest? Second, is the particular situation presented regulated
by the state supreme court and if so, can the two forms of regulation
coexist without stepping on each other's toes?
The Washington Supreme Court briefly mentioned another
consideration in Roach v. Mead.6? In this case, the plaintiff client, upon
investment advice by his attorney, made personal loans to the attorney
that the attorney never repaid.' The attorney subsequently filed for
bankruptcy and the client sued the attorney's partnership, alleging
various causes of action including recovery under the state's Unfair
Trade Practices Act.67 The claim under the Act alleged "that the
partnership created a likelihood of confusion concerning the service it
59. "Learned Professions" such as medicine, theology, and law were generally exempted
from certain statutory provisions. For more on this topic, see generally Debra D. Burke, The
Learned Profession Exemption of the North Carolina Deceptive Trade Practices Act: The
Wrong Bright Line?, 15 CAMPBELL L. REv. 223 (1993).
60. See Short v. Demopolis, 691 P.2d 163, 168 (Wash. 1984).
61. Id.
62 Id. at 169.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 170.
65. 722 P.2d 1229, 1234 (Wash. 1986)
66. See id. at 1231.
67. See id.
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provided to plaintiff,... represented" that it had "qualities that it didn't
possess..., and misleadingly represented the nature of the loan."
6
To determine whether the Unlawful Trade Practices Act covered
legal services, the court looked at "the customary or predominant
purpose of the legal'services obtained by [the] plaintiff."69 The court
ultimately found that the Act did not cover the particular situation at
hand because the plaintiff was seeking recovery from the partnership
and the attorney was not acting within the scope of his employment."
However, it did suggest that if the legal services sought were "generally
and customarily for a personal, family, or household purpose," the Act
would govern the lawyer's conduct.7
From these cases we can develop a framework for determining
whether an attorney's conduct should be governed by a deceptive trade
practices act. When the "conduct" engaged in is deceptive advertising,
there is a strong presumption that advertising constitutes a "trade" or
"commerce" meant to be governed by the act. Likewise, if coverage of
the conduct that the attorney engaged in would serve the public interest,
the act should govern the conduct. The situation is a bit stickier,
however, when the conduct engaged in is conduct that typically would
fall under a malpractice claim-for example, negligent handling of a
case, failure to make timely filings with the court, or omission of a cause
of action.' Is application of a deceptive trade practices act really
necessary at that point or is it just another, most likely unnecessary,
route for recovery in our litigious society? The answer may become
clearer after an examination of decisions from courts that have rejected
application of such acts to lawyers.
C. Refusal to Extend Liability to Attorneys
At least six states have explicitly refused to extend liability under
their Unfair Trade or Consumer Protection Acts; however, they have
done so in two different ways. Three of the six-Maryland, North
Carolina, and Ohio-have expressly excluded lawyers via the statute
while the other three, absent statutory exclusion, have judicially created
exceptions.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See id.
71. Id at 1234-35.
72. See infra text accompanying notes 112-28.
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1. Statutory Exclusion
The Ohio Legislature chose to specifically exclude lawyers from its
"Unfair, Deceptive, or Unconscionable Acts or Practices" statute. In
relevant part, the statute defines a "Consumer Transaction" as "a sale,
lease.., or other transfer of an item of goods [or] a service... to an
individual... but does not include [a] transaction between... public
accountants and their clients [or] attorneys, physicians, or dentists and
their clients or patients."'74 Both North Carolina and Maryland have
similar provisions. For example, North Carolina's statute provides that
"'commerce' includes all business activities, however denominated, but
does not include professional services rendered by a member of a
learned profession."76
This exemption was not part of North Carolina's original Act but
was added in 1977.' Thus far, North Carolina has been the only state to
specifically exclude "members of the 'learned profession."
' 78
Historically, these professions were excluded from antitrust laws
because they "were characterized by a spirit of public service. ' 79
However, this is no longer always the case because the Supreme Court
has held that antitrust laws do apply to the "learned professions" in
certain circumstances.' Many states' unfair trade practices acts were
modeled after federal antitrust laws; for this reason, it is illogical to use
the "learned profession" standard as a basis for exclusion of the legal
profession from an unfair trade practice act.8"
As noted earlier, many of these statutes were enacted before the
landmark Supreme Court decision in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona.,
The Court's holding essentially removed the legal profession from its
lofty perch as a profession that was "above trade."" From this
73. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1345.01(A) (West 1998).
74. Id. (emphasis added). This is Ohio's version of a "learned profession" exemption.
See Burke, supra note 59.
75. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(b) (1998); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I § 13-104
(1991).
76. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(b) (emphasis added).
77. See Burke, supra note 59, at 241.
7& Id. at 242.
79. Id. at 243.
80. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar Ass'n., 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (holding learned
professions not "per se exempt" from antitrust laws).
81. See id. at 779.
82. 433 U.S. 350,380-82 (1977).
83. See id.
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conclusion it logically follows that the legal profession, in certain
instances, does engage in trade and is therefore not "above" the realms
of unfair trade practices acts. However, several courts have not come to
this conclusion.
2. Judicial Exclusion
The first court to hold that a state unfair trade practice act did not
apply to attorneys was an Illinois Appellate Court in Frahm v.
Urkovich.84 In this case, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant, an
attorney who had represented them in various real estate transactions,
had given false and misleading information to the plaintiffs.' This
information caused the plaintiffs to cosign a loan for a real estate
project." This project directly benefited the defendant in this case and
resulted in a substantial loss to the plaintiffs.' The plaintiffs filed suit
against the defendant attorney, alleging "attorney malpractice, breach of
fiduciary duty," and violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and
Deceptive Business Practices Act.ss
The purpose of the Illinois Act "is to protect consumers and
borrowers and businessmen against fraud, unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.""' The court refused
to apply the Act to attorney conduct and stated that to do so would
"necessarily equate the practice of law with an ordinary commercial
enterprise. ' The court viewed the defendant's actions as "misconduct
amounting to professional malpractice" and interpreted the statute as
not applicable to an attorney engaged in the actual practice of law.9' It
did not see the practice of law as the type of practice that reaches
consumers generally.'
84. 447 N.E.2d 1007 (Il. App. Ct. 1983).
85. See id. at 1008.
86. See id.
87. See id. at 1008-09.
88. Id. at 1009.
89. Id.
90. Frahm v. Urkovich, 447 N.E.2d 1007,1010 (Ml. App. Ct. 1983).
91. Id. at 1009.
92. See id. at 1014. The Illinois Supreme Court again examined the application of
Illinois' Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act in Cripe v. Leiter, 703 N.E.2d
100 (IlM. 1998). In this case the plaintiff alleged that her attorney, the defendant, charged
"excessive and unreasonable fees that bore no relationship to the actual time spent...
representing [the plaintiff]." Id. at 102. The plaintiff sought recovery under the Consumer
Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. See id. The court rejected the plaintiff's claim
for two reasons. First, the court held that legal fees could not be separated from legal
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The Supreme Court of New Hampshire faced a similar situation in
Rousseau v. Eshleman.9 This case involved a real estate transaction in
which the defendant attorney advised his client to purchase a
commercial property with an assumable mortgage.9 However, after the
sale was completed Eshleman's client "learned that the mortgage was
not assumable, and that the note instead became a demand note due
and payable at the option of the bank upon the plaintiff's purchase of
the property."9 The client subsequently "sustained a substantial loss on
[the] investment. ' 6  In addition to claims of legal malpractice and
negligent misrepresentation, the client sought recovery and alleged
entitlement to treble damages under New Hampshire's Consumer
Protection Act.9
The trial court jury found that "the defendant's actions constituted a
willful and knowing violation of the consumer protection act."93 The
supreme court reversed, holding that the Act did not apply to
attorneys.'9 It based its holding on the fact that pursuant to the New
Hampshire Constitution, the regulation of attorney conduct was "an
area of shared responsibility between the legislative and judicial
branches of government" and absent specific legislative intent to include
attorneys, the statute was not meant to govern attorney conduct. '0 The
court also reasoned that because the state legislature and constitution
had given the power to regulate the professional conduct of attorneys,
application of the consumer protection act to this area could give rise to
"practical problems.) 101
The Superior Court of New Jersey has also exempted the legal
profession from liability under New Jersey's Consumer Fraud Act.10,
services, which are not covered by the Act. See id. at 107. Second, the court held that since
attorneys' fees were regulated by the Rules of Professional Conduct, it was not necessary to
provide an additional remedy for excessive fees. See id. at 106. What the court failed to take
into consideration is the fact that although an attorney may be subject to disciplinary action
for charging excessive fees, this offers most plaintiffs little comfort.
93. 519 A.2d 243, 244 (N.H. 1986).
94. See id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See id.
98. Id.
99. See Rousseau v. Eshleman, 519 A.2d 243,245 (N.H. 1986).
100. Id.
101. Id. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire did not offer any explanation of what
these "practical problems" may be.
102 See Vort v. Hollander, 607 A.2d 1339, 1339-42 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992).
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The case that led to this holding involved a fee dispute between an
attorney and his client.1" The client refused to pay fees in excess of an
alleged fee cap agreement between the attorney and client 1 4 The
attorney sought recovery of the fees and the client filed a counterclaim,
asserting violations of the Consumer Fraud Act and legal malpractice.0 5
The court held that "it is clear that attorney's services do not fall
within the intendment of the Consumer Fraud Act."'' It based this
holding on a prior case where the court concluded that real estate
brokers, like other "professionals", perform an activity that "is
recognized as something beyond the ordinary commercial seller of
goods or services-an activity beyond the pale of the act under
consideration. ' '""l Although the New Jersey Legislature responded to
this holding by amending the Act to include deceptive practices in the
sale of real estate, it did not amend the Act to include professionals such
as doctors, dentists, and lawyers."° The court basically interpreted the
legislature's failure to include the "learned professions" as an
endorsement of its prior holding in Nevroski.1  Finally, the court noted
that the New Jersey Supreme Court regulates the practice of law in New
Jersey,"' a possible separation of powers issue."
103. See id. at 1340-41.
104. See id. at 1341.
105. See id.
106. Id. at 1342.
107. Id. (quoting Neveroski v. Blair, 141 NJ. Super. 365,358 (1976)).
108. See id. at 1339-42.
109. See id.
110. See id. The court was alluding to the separation of powers doctrine as discussed
(and dismissed) by the Supreme Court of Connecticut in Heslin v. Connecticut Law Clinic of
Trantolo and Trantolo, 461 A.2d 928 (Conn. 1983) and the Supreme Court of Washington in
Short v. Demopolis, 691 P.2d 163 (Wash. 1984). Both the Heslin and Short courts recognized
that unfair trade practices acts serve a different purpose than judiciary's regulation of
attorney conduct and the two can peacefully, and constitutionally, coexist.
111. It should also be noted that three additional states have examined whether unfair
trade practices statutes apply to lawyers and have suggested that they do not. See Robertson
v. White, 633 F. Supp. 954, 978 (W.D. Ark. 1986) (holding that complaint failed to
demonstrate any fraud by lawyer or accountant but regardless, Consumer Protection Act is
not meant to regulate lawyer-client or accountant-client relationships); Keyser v. St. Mary's
Hosp., 662 F.Supp. 191, 194 (D. Idaho 1987) (refusing to apply Consumer Protection Act to
medical profession); Gatten v. Merzi, 579 A.2d 974, 976 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990), app. denied,
596 A.2d 157 (Pa. 1991) (holding that application of Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer
Protection law to physicians would" . . . mak[e] a physician the absolute guarantor of both his
treatment and the anticipated results.").
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IV. OTHER CAUSES OF AcTION AGAINST ATTORNEYS
Although some states have held that attorneys can be liable to their
clients under consumer fraud and unfair trade practices statutes, this is
obviously not the common route of recovery for most plaintiffs. The
majority of "actions brought by clients against their attorneys are for
negligence [or] a fiduciary breach. 112 Liability under any "malpractice"
theory must be premised on the following: the existence of a duty, which
was breached by the lawyer and that breach was the proximate cause of
the plaintiff's (client's) damage."3
The extent of the attorney's duty depends on the nature of the
attorney-client relationship and a breach of that duty will typically give
rise to a claim of negligence."4 To determine whether a duty existed, the
first inquiry is "whether the attorney undertook to perform any service
[for the client/plaintiff]." ' 5 However, the issue in a legal malpractice suit
usually is not whether a duty existed, but the extent of that duty.
116
Proving causation presents the greatest hurdle for a plaintiff in a
legal malpractice action. To establish causation, the plaintiff must prove
that "the [plaintiff's] loss would not have occurred or that the amount
would have been less.., but for the attorney's conduct. 117 This is often
referred to as "a trial within a trial.'1 . Not only must the plaintiff show
that the attorney was negligent, but he or she must also prove that the
negligence was the reason that the harm occurred-typically, that it was
the reason that the plaintiff lost his or her case."'
A client may also have a cause of action against his or her attorney
based on fraud. The same basic rules that apply to any defendant who
committed fraud also apply to a professional who committed fraud. The
primary difference is that "an attorney's advice or opinion, if knowingly
false, may constitute fraud. ' '... A plaintiff "in a fraud case must establish
that there was a '(1) [F]alse representation or concealment of a material
fact, (2) reasonably calculated to deceive, (3) made with intent to
112. MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 55, § 8.1, at 401.
113. See id. § 8.2, at 401.
114. See id. at 402.
115. Id. § 8.2, at 405.
116. See id. at 407.
117. Id. § 8.2, at 412 (citing Molever v. Roush, 732 P.2d 1105 (Ariz. App. 1986)); Claire
Associates by Livaditis v. Pontikes, 502 N.E.2d 1186 (Ill. App. 1986); Maryland Casualty Co.
v. Price, Smith, Spilman & Clay, 224 F. 271 (S.D.W. Va. 1915)).
118. See MALLEN & SMrrH, supra note 55, § 8.3, at 412.
119. See id. § 8.11, at 429.
120. Id. § 8.8, at 422.
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deceive, (4) which does in fact deceive, (5) resulting in damage to the
injured party.' 12' Fraud can be difficult to prove, and is not a "favored
action" for plaintiffs.Y
An action under a consumer fraud and unfair trade practice statute
has several advantages for a plaintiff. First, it is easier to prove a
violation of most statutes than to prove fraud or even negligence."
Most statutes "merely require proof of either a representation which
tends to deceive or some act of unfairness." 24 A plaintiff does not need
to prove an intent to deceive nor does he or she have to worry about
contributory negligence because the "effect of the actor's conduct on the
consuming public" is the relevant factor.' s
In addition, an action under a consumer protection and unfair trade
statute often allows the plaintiff to recover more money than in a legal
malpractice or fraud action.1 2 Typically, these statutes allow for treble
damages; "punitive damages for fraud or negligence are to be awarded
only when the wrong is done willfully or there are other extenuating
circumstances evidencing a reckless disregard for the plaintiff's rights. ' 7
Finally, most fraud statutes allow the plaintiff to recover attorney's fees,
especially in cases where the wrongdoer's action was wiUlful."
Consumer fraud and unfair trade practices acts appear to be an easy
route of recovery for the victim of the actions these statutes seek to
prevent. So why aren't more plaintiffs turning to these statutes,
especially in Wisconsin? A more careful inspection of Wisconsin's
Unfair Trade Practices statute reveals the answer.129
V. UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES IN WISCONSIN
A. Origin and Interpretation
Section 100.201" was enacted in 1921. The purpose of the statute is
to regulate unfair trade practices and unfair methods of competition in
121. See Burke, supra note 59, at 236 (citing Ragsdale v. Kennedy, 209 S.E.2d 494, 500
(N.C. 1974)); see also Goerke v. Vojvodich, 226 N.W. 2d 211 (Wis. 1975).
122. MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 55, § 8.8, at 423.
123. See Burke, supra note 59, at 236-37.
124. Id. at 237.
125. Id.
126. See id. at 238.
127. Id. at 238.
128. See Burke, supra note 59, at 240.
129. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 100.20 (West 1998).
130. Id.
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business. Section 93.01 defines the term "business":
The following terms, whenever used in chs. 93 to 100 or in any
other regulation thereunder..., have the meaning here
indicated. (1m) "Business" includes any business, except that of
banks, savings banks, savings and loan associations and insurance
companies. "Business includes public utilities and
telecommunications carriers to the extent that their activities...
are exempt from regulation from the public service
commission."'
The statute was patterned after section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act of 1914.132 Although this statute was enacted at the
beginning of the century, it was not really used until the late 1960's and
early 1970's.133 The Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer
Protection has the job of regulating business under this Act and
assessing what constitutes "unfair" business practices."3  The
Department "has been largely guided by the rules and decisions under
section 5 of the FTC Act."'35 The FTC has broad discretion in making
determinations of fairness and has developed a flexible standard that
looks to public policy considerations to determine whether a particular
act or practice is unfair.136
B. Applications
Section 100.20 has been applied to a variety of unfair practices.
These unfair practices are identified through both general and specific
orders promulgated by the Department of Agriculture, Trade and
Consumer Protection. For example, through general orders, the
Department has classified deceptive home improvement trade practices
as an area governed by section 100.20.37 Other areas include referral
selling plans, chain distributor schemes, and certain landlord-tenant
situations." Wisconsin has not looked at whether this statute should
apply to the "business" practices of members of the "learned
professions."
131. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 93.01 (West 1998).
132. 38 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1995).
133. See James D. Jeffries, Protection for Consumers Against Unfair and Deceptive
Business, 57 MARQ. L. REV. 559,572 (1974).
134. See id. at 573.
135. Id. at 573 (referring to 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1970).
136. See Jeffries, supra note 133, at 573-74.
137. See id. at 578 (referring to WIS. ADMIN. CODE, ch. Ag 110 (1974)).
138. See Jeffries, supra note 133, at 580-97.
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Should Wisconsin decide to hold professionals liable under section
100.20, it would do so under subsection (1t).' 39 This section makes it
unlawful "for a person to provide any service... that facilitates or
promotes an unfair method of competition in business [or] an unfair
trade practice in business."' Attorneys and other professionals are
supplying a service, not a product.
C. Remedies
The remedies available under section 100.20 are found in subsections
three through six."' Subsection three gives the Department the authority
to issue an order enjoining a party "from employing any method of
competition in business or trade practice in business which is
determined... to be unfair." 42 In addition to injunctive relief, under
subsection five, any person suffering pecuniary loss because of a
violation of an order issued under section 100.20 "may sue for damages
and recover twice the amount of [his or her] monetary loss, together
with costs [and] a reasonable attorney's fee."' 43
While this may sound like a generous remedy, there remains one
problem for the client injured by his or her attorney. According to the
language of the statute, damages may be recovered only when the
defendant violates an order of the Department." This means that for a
plaintiff to have a cause of action under section 100.20, the Department
of Agriculture must have promulgated a code section (general order)
specifically prohibiting the conduct committed by the defendant, as it
did in cases of home improvement or chain distributor schemes.' 45
D. Application to the Legal Profession
There is no language in section 100.20 that precludes a court from
holding an attorney liable under the statute. In fact, the statute
specifically makes it unlawful for any person to provide a service in
violation of the statute and the legislature did not exclude the practice of
law from the definition of business found in section 93.01.'" There is no
139. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 100.20(lt) (West 1998).
140. Id. (emphasis added).
141. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 100.20(3)-(6) (West 1998).
142. § 100.20(3).
143. § 100.20(5).
144. See id.
145. See Jeffries, supra note 133, at 577.
146. See WIS. STAT. ANN. §93.01 (West 1997).
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reason that the Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer
Protection should not issue an order prohibiting members of the legal
profession from providing any services that facilitate or promote an
unfair method of competition or an unfair trade practice in business.
In addition, as noted above, the Wisconsin Legislature has provided
that interpretation of the statute should be guided by the federal courts'
interpretations of section 45(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission
Act.147 This presents a situation exactly like the one discussed by the
Heslin court.'" The court was interpreting Connecticut's Unfair Trade
Practices Act,149 also based on section 45(a)(1)." Based on the United
States Supreme Court's application of section 45(a)(1) to the medical
profession' and decision that the practice of law may constitute a trade
or commerce under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 2 the Heslin court held
that in certain circumstances, the "federal courts would construe the
FTC Act as applying to attorneys." '
Wisconsin should follow Connecticut's lead and allow persons
injured by unfair trade practices engaged in by attorneys to bring an
action under its Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Like Connecticut,
however, Wisconsin should limit the extent that attorneys can be held
liable under the Act. Liability should be limited to situations where
attorneys are engaged in the commercial and entrepreneurial aspects of
law. In addition, application of the Act should be limited to situations
where it would be in the public interest to prevent the conduct. This
could include "how the price of legal services is determined, billed, and
collected and the way a law firm obtains, retains, and dismisses
cients;"' false and misleading advertisements; and other situations
where an attorney is not providing traditional "legal services" to a client.
This would not include negligence and other traditional legal
malpractice actions.55
147. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1997).
148. See Heslin v. Connecticut Law Clinic of Trantolo & Trontolo, 461 A.2d 938 (Conn.
1983); see also supra text accompanying notes 32-50.
149. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-110b (West 1992 & Supp. 1999).
150. See Heslin, 461 A.2d at 942.
151. See Am. Med. Ass'n v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980), affd by an
equally divided court, 455 U.S. 676 (1982).
152. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773,786-88 (1975).
153. Heslin, 461 A.2d at 942
154. These standards were recognized by the Washington Supreme Court in Short v.
Demopolis, 691 P.2d 163,168 (Wash. 1984).
155. See supra text accompanying notes 112-28.
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Additionally, Wisconsin courts would need to address whether
applying the Act to attorney conduct would violate the separation of
powers doctrine under the Wisconsin Constitution. However, the courts
should recognize that Wisconsin's Rules of Professional Conduct and
the Act serve distinct purposes and provide different remedies. There is
no legitimate reason to deny a proper plaintiff a remedy through the
Act in certain limited circumstances.
VI. CONCLUSION
Unquestionably, the nature of the legal profession is changing. The
public and even the courts no longer perceive legal professionals as
"above trade." 156  It is permissible for lawyers to engage in
advertisingTand their practices can be subject to anti-trust laws." Along
with these changes come increased risk of liability for attorneys under
theories of negligence, fraud, and in some circumstances, unfair trade
conduct.
Attorneys should be held accountable for their actions and if these
actions include a violation of a consumer unfair trade protection act,
then they must face the consequences. By holding attorneys liable
under these acts in limited circumstances, courts are not opening the
floodgates of litigation. On the contrary, liability under such an act
would be premised only on unfair and deceptive conduct. The
availability to plaintiffs of twice the amount of pecuniary loss along with
costs including attorney's fees,59 will serve as a strong deterrent to the
attorney who engages in unfair and deceptive conduct and as an
appropriate remedy to members of the public damaged by such conduct.
AMY ALGIERS ANDERSON
156. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350,380-82 (1977).
157. See id.
158. See generally Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar Assoc., 421 U.S. 773, 793 (1975).
159. See WIs. STAT. ANN. § 100.20(5) (West 1998).
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